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Abstract 
 
We investigate whether and to what extent publicly listed corporations voluntarily comply with and 
disclose recommended good corporate governance (CG) practices, and distinctively examine whether the 
observed cross-sectional differences in such CG disclosures can be explained by ownership and board 
mechanisms with specific focus on Saudi Arabia. Our results suggest that corporations with larger boards, 
a big-four auditor, higher government ownership, a CG committee and higher institutional ownership 
disclose considerably more than those that are not. By contrast, we find that an increase in block 
ownership significantly reduces CG disclosure. Our results are generally robust to a number of 
econometric models that control for different types of disclosure indices, firm-specific characteristics and 
firm-level fixed-effects. Our results have important implications for policy-makers, practitioners and 
regulatory authorities, especially those in developing countries across the globe. 
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Introduction 
In this paper, we seek to contribute to the extant corporate governance (CG) literature by 
examining the extent to which publicly listed corporations voluntarily comply with and disclose good 
recommendations relating to their CG practices, and investigate whether corporate ownership and board 
mechanisms can explain observable cross-sectional differences in such CG disclosures with specific focus 
on Saudi Arabia.  
Over the past decades, the adoption of CG codes by an increasing number of developing countries 
has generated a significant research interest on the actual extent of, and factors leading to or impeding 
implementation at the firm-level and on the consequences of such implementation at the macro or 
national-level (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009; Andreasson, 2011; 
Salterio et al., 2013; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2015). In the main, such CG studies are motivated by an 
instrumental-led expectation that CG codes might help address systemic issues of corporate accountability, 
responsibility, corruption and transparency (Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012;  
Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; Samaha et al., 2012; Christensen et al., 2015; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013), and 
thereby improving corporate performance by reducing corporate financial risk in developing countries 
(Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper & Love, 2004; Beiner et al., 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Henry, 2008; 
Bauer et al., 2010; Renders et al., 2010; Giroud & Mueller, 2011; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Ntim et al., 
2012a, 2013, 2015a, b; Tariq & Abbas, 2013; Christensen et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015). 
 To date, however, a good number of these studies report mixed results in terms of actual 
implementation and/or of positive consequences (Daily et al., 2003; Wieland, 2005; Brennan & Solomon, 
2008; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). More importantly, whereas prior research indicates that corporate 
decisions, including disclosure choices and strategies are often decided by corporate boards and owners 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, b), existing studies that empirically examine the different extent to which a 
firm’s board and ownership mechanisms can serve as strong or weak antecedents of voluntary compliance 
and disclosure of good CG practices are generally rare (Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Bozec & Bozec, 2007; 
Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Salterio et al., 2013), but particularly acute in 
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developing countries (Tsamenyi et al., 2007;  Rouf, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012b; Samaha et al., 2012). This 
intuition is motivated by the fact that the capacity of CG codes to achieve good governance depends 
largely on the extent to which senior managers, owners and companies are willing to engage in effective 
voluntary compliance and disclosure (Core, 2001; Tariq & Abbas, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013).  
Thus, this study seeks to explore CG reforms that have been pursued in developing countries with 
specific focus on Saudi Arabia. Our decision to focus on Saudi Arabia is motivated by a number of 
reasons. First, and in line with global developments, Saudi has pursued CG reforms in the form of the 
2006 Saudi CG Code. As will be discussed further, and similar to most developing countries, the Saudi 
CG Code adopts a UK-style voluntary1 ‘comply or explain’ compliance and disclosure regime (Alshehri 
& Solomon, 2012; Piesse et al., 2012). Distinct from most Anglo-American countries, the Saudi CG Code 
explicitly requires firms to go beyond the narrow financial and regulatory aspects of CG by addressing the 
interests of a broad range of stakeholders, such as creditors, customers, employees, local communities and 
suppliers (CMA, 2006, p.4), and thus investigating CG practices in the Saudi context may contribute to 
extant literature by providing new insights on the effectiveness of CG reforms in developing countries.  
Second, the Saudi corporate context has distinctive cultural features of having strong hierarchical 
social structure (Al-Twaijry et al., 2002; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007) in which greater importance is usually 
attached to informal relationships, such as kingship and tribal affiliations than formal CG and 
accountability mechanisms like corporate boards and their sub-committees (Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 2008). 
The Saudi corporate setting is further characterised by concentrated ownership structures (mainly by 
government and families), prohibition of direct foreign equity-holdings and low levels of institutional 
ownership, resulting in insufficient activism by shareholders and a weak capacity to implement and 
enforce corporate regulations (Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004; Piesse et al., 2012). In particular, 
concentrated ownership renders the capital, corporate control, product, professional services and top 
managerial labour markets weak (Gillan, 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a, b), which can 
impact negatively on the willingness of corporations to engage in voluntary disclosure. Arguably, these 
contextual challenges raise serious empirical questions as to whether the 2006 Saudi voluntary compliance 
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and disclosure CG Code can improve CG standards of Saudi listed corporations (Al-Moataz & Hussainey, 
2010; Munisi & Randoy, 2013; Soliman, 2013a, b).  
Third, despite increasing theoretical and empirical evidence that the ability of any single theory to 
fully explain the reasons and motivations underlying corporate voluntary disclosure behavior is limited 
(Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Chen & Roberts, 2010; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, b), existing studies on 
voluntary disclosure are either largely descriptive in nature (Bebenroth, 2005; Cromme, 2005; Werder et 
al., 2005; Alsaeed, 2006; Pass, 2006) or rely on single theoretical perspective (Bozec & Bozec, 2007; 
Hooghiemstra, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b), and 
thereby impairing the development of new theoretical insights, advancement and understanding. 
Fourth, and unlike most Arabic countries, Saudi Arabia is a major ‘G-20’ economy, being the 
world’s largest producer of oil, as well as playing host to some of the world’s largest multinationals 
(Alsaeed, 2006; SFG, 2009; Al-Filali & Gallarotti, 2012). For example, Saudi accounted for 44% and 25% 
of total Arab market capitalisation and GDP, respectively, in 2010 (SFG, 2009; Alshehri & Solomon, 
2012). This means that unlike most Arabic countries, any CG failures may have serious implications far 
beyond the Middle East and developing countries. 
Generally, and notwithstanding the increasing number of CG Codes in developing countries, such 
as Saudi Arabia (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Samaha et al., 2012), existing studies investigating 
the effectiveness of voluntary CG Codes in improving governance standards are disproportionately 
concentrated in a few developed countries (Pellens et al., 2001; Bebenroth, 2005; Cromme, 2005; Werder 
et al., 2005; Pass, 2006; Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin 
& Ow-Yong, 2012; Salterio et al., 2013). We contend, however, that in developing countries with 
different cultural, regulatory, CG and institutional contexts, such as Saudi Arabia (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009), voluntary compliance with CG Codes can be expected to vary from what has been found 
in developed countries. Therefore, an investigation of voluntary CG disclosures in developing countries, 
where there is a dearth of empirical evidence, is crucial in offering a more complete understanding of CG 
reforms and disclosure behaviour. In this case and although there have been a number of CG studies 
 6 
 
 
within the Saudi corporate context, notably by Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008), Al-Nodel and Hussainey 
(2010), Alshehri and Solomon (2012), Piesse et al. (2012), Al-Janadi et al. (2013) and Al-Moataz and 
Hussainey (2015), our study differs from existing ones in terms of: (i) its explicit construction of a Saudi 
CG disclosure index based directly on the 2006 Saudi CG Code; (ii) its reliance on a larger panel data set 
drawn from the 2004-2010 period; and (iii) its evaluation of a broader set of CG provisions and 
disclosures.   
In doing so, we extend, as well as make a number of distinct and new contributions to the extant 
CG literature. First, using data extracted directly from annual reports of a sample of 80 Saudi listed 
corporations from 2004 to 2010, we contribute to the literature by providing detailed evidence, for the first 
time, on the level of compliance with the 2006 Saudi CG Code by constructing a broad CG compliance 
and disclosure index containing 65 CG provisions. Second, we contribute to the literature by offering 
evidence on the extent to which the introduction of the 2006 Saudi CG Code has helped in improving CG 
standards in Saudi listed corporations. Third, we contribute to the literature by applying and informing our 
analysis with insights from a number of theories, including agency, legitimacy, resource dependence and 
stakeholder theories. Finally, we make a new contribution to the literature by providing empirical 
evidence on the extent to which corporate ownership and board mechanisms influence the level of CG 
disclosure in Saudi listed corporations. This can improve current understanding of the main factors that 
drive the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of CG practices in a major developing Arabic 
country in which various stakeholders, such as the Saudi government, the Saudi Capital Market Authority 
(CMA) and the Saudi Stock Exchange (‘Tadawul’) take a keen interest in CG and stakeholder issues.  
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides an overview of the Saudi 
stock exchange, CG reforms pursued and the Saudi corporate context. The following sections review the 
antecedents of the prior voluntary CG disclosure literature and develop hypotheses, describe the data and 
research methodology, and report empirical results, while the conclusion contains a summary and a brief 
discussion of policy implications, limitations and recommendations for future research. 
 
 7 
 
 
The Saudi Stock Exchange, CG Policy Reforms and the Saudi Corporate Context 
 
 Although formal public trading of stocks did not start in Saudi until the 1980s, public corporations 
had long operated in the country in the mid-1930s, when the Arab Automobile corporation was 
established as the first joint stock corporation (‘Tadawul’, 2012). By 1975, there were about 14 publicly 
listed corporations, increasing further to 75 listed firms by 2000 (SFG, 2009; Tadawul, 2012). The rapid 
economic expansion, arising from a boom in oil income in the 1970’s led to the formation of a number of 
large corporations and joint stock banks (Alsaeed, 2006; Al-Filali & Gallarotti, 2012). However, stock 
trading was not formalised until the early 1980’s when the government embarked upon establishing an 
official stock exchange as part of the general reforms towards creating a free market economy (Hussainey 
& Al-Nodel, 2008; Tadawul, 2012). In 1984, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was charged 
with the responsibility of developing, operating, regulating and monitoring the market until the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA) was established in July 2003 (SFG, 2009; Al-Janadi et al., 2013). In 2003 and as 
a part of the CG reforms, the Saudi Stock Exchange (‘Tadawul’) was established with the responsibility of 
operating the market, whilst the CMA remained as the sole regulatory body of the market (Alshehri & 
Solomon, 2012; Soliman, 2013a, b). Since its establishment in 2003, the Tadawul has experienced rapid 
growth through greater listings and vibrant trading activities. For example, about 68 corporations were 
listed between 2007 and 2010 (SFG, 2009; ‘Tadawul’, 2012). This increased the number of listed 
corporations substantially from 77 in 2005 to 145 in December 2010 with a stock market capitalisation of 
about $533bn, and accounting approximately for 44% of total Arab stock market capitalisation (IFC, 2008; 
SFG, 2009; ‘Tadawul’, 2012). 
 With respect to CG, and although legislation regulating the behaviour of corporations, their 
directors and officers has long existed in Saudi Arabia in the form of the 1965 Companies Act (Al-Razeen 
& Karbhari, 2004; Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 2008), there is a consensus that in a narrow sense, CG in Saudi 
Arabia was formally institutionalised by the publication of the Saudi CG Code in November 2006 (CMA, 
2006; Al-Nodel & Hussainey, 2010; Soliman, 2013a, b; Al-Moataz & Hussainey 2015). In fact, attempts 
at pursuing CG reforms in order to enhance CG standards in Saudi public corporations began in earnest in 
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2003, but early rapid growth in the stock market diverted the attention of the CMA and the relevant 
stakeholders from it (SFG, 2009; Alshehri & Solomon, 2012). However, a sudden fall of about 25% in 
value of listed stocks in February 2006 alone, and an overall fall of 53% by the end of 2006, wiping over 
$480bn off the market’s value highlighted the need to improve CG standards in Saudi publicly listed 
corporations (SFG, 2009). As a result, academics, investors and practitioners placed pressure on the CMA 
to urgently improve CG standards by: (i) deepening the market, including increasing its size (e.g., number 
of listed firms) and allowing direct foreign/institutional investor participation2; (ii) improving disclosure 
and transparency; and (iii) clamping down on insider trading (SFG, 2009; Alshehri & Solomon, 2012). 
 Consequently, a first draft of the Saudi CG Code was issued for consultation in July 2006 with the 
final version published in November 2006. The Code addresses a number of CG issues relating to: (i) 
board of directors; (ii) disclosure and transparency; (iii) shareholder rights and the general assembly; and 
(iv) internal control and risk management (CMA, 2006).3 Noticeably, the recommendations of the Saudi 
CG Code were largely similar to those of the UK’s Cadbury Report of 1992 (Alshehri & Solomon, 2012; 
Piesse et al., 2012). For example, and similar to the Cadbury Report, the Saudi Code suggested an Anglo-
American style unitary board of directors, consisting of executive and non-executive directors, who are 
primarily accountable to shareholders operating within a voluntary (‘comply or explain’) compliance and 
disclosure regime (see the Appendix; CMA, 2006). Distinct from the Cadbury Report, however, it 
explicitly requires Saudi firms to address not only the interests of shareholders, but also those of other 
stakeholders, such as employees and local communities, although this part of the Code is relatively less 
developed and clear as to their implications for CG, compliance and disclosure (CMA, 2006, p.4). 
 In addition to pursuing CG reforms, and as has been previously explained, the Saudi corporate 
context is characterised by: (i) a highly hierarchical social structure; (ii) concentrated ownership; (iii) low 
level of institutional shareholding and weak shareholder activism; (iv) the absence of direct 
foreign/institutional investors; (v) weak enforcement of corporate regulations; and (vi) weak market for 
capital, managerial labour and corporate control (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Alsaeed, 2006; Piesse et al., 
2012). As a result, critical concerns have been expressed as to whether, given the relative uniqueness of 
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the Saudi corporate context, a voluntary compliance and disclosure regime like the 2006 Saudi CG Code 
can be effective in raising CG standards in Saudi Arabia (IFC, 2008; SFG, 2009). Consequently, we seek 
to examine the extent to which Saudi listed corporations are voluntarily complying with the CG provisions 
contained in the 2006 Saudi CG Code and investigate whether corporate ownership and board 
mechanisms can explain observable differences in the level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
Therefore, we now consider the evidence and insights from previous studies, and subsequently 
develop our hypotheses. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Previous studies have employed a number of theories, including agency, legitimacy, resource 
dependence and stakeholder theories4 to examine how corporate ownership structure and board 
mechanisms affect: (i) general voluntary disclosures (Eng &Mak, 2003; Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004; 
Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et. al., 2006; Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Rouf, 2011; Taylor et al., 2011; Al-
Janadi et al., 2013); and (ii) voluntary CG disclosures (Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Bozec & Bozec, 2007; 
Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 2008; Alshehri & Solomon, 2012; Piesse et al., 2012; 
Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012;  Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Al-Moataz & Hussainey, 2015; Mahadeo & 
Soobaroyen, 2015). Others have examined how general firm-specific features, such as size and industry, 
drive corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008;  Fifka, 2013), whilst a 
limited number of studies have investigated how ownership and board mechanisms affect CSR disclosures 
(Jamali et al., 2008; Reverte, 2009; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, b).  
Hence, and relying on insights from agency, legitimacy, resource dependence and stakeholder 
theories, we draw from these strands of the literature, supplemented by the implications of the Saudi 
context to identify potential ownership and board mechanisms that might affect the voluntary disclosure of 
CG practices. Specifically, we examine how corporate: (i) ownership mechanisms (block ownership, 
government ownership and institutional ownership); and (ii) board mechanisms (board size, the presence 
of a CG committee and audit firm size)5 affect voluntary disclosure of recommended good CG practices.  
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Corporate Ownership Structure Mechanisms  
Block Ownership and CG Disclosure 
  
From an agency theory perspective, closer managerial monitoring and lesser information 
asymmetry that is usually associated with block ownership can be expected to minimise agency problems 
and improve financial performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993; Botosan, 1997), and hence a 
lesser need for increased CG disclosures in order to gain legitimacy (legitimacy theory) from powerful 
corporate stakeholders (stakeholder theory), such as creditors, employee unions, government and 
shareholders, whose resources (resource dependence), for example finance, contacts and contacts, are 
arguably critical to the ability of any corporation to maintain sustainable operations (Branco & Rodrigues, 
2008; Chen & Roberts, 2010). Thus, in this case, block ownership can serve as a substitute for good 
governance arrangements, including less disclosure relating to CG practices (Bozec & Bozec, 2007). In 
contrast, disperse ownership requires greater monitoring, which can be minimised through increased 
corporate disclosures (Enk & Mak, 2003; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, b).  
In line with the results of past empirical studies (Patel et al., 2002; Barako et al., 2006; 
Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Reverte, 2009; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a, b), Alsaeed (2006) 
report a negative link between block ownership and voluntary disclosure for a 2003 cross-sectional sample 
of 40 Saudi listed corporations, whereas using a 2009 cross-sectional sample of 100 Egyptian corporations, 
Samaha et al. (2012) find that corporations with lower block ownership have higher levels of CG 
disclosure. Similarly, using a 2002 cross-sectional sample of 244 Canadian listed firms, Bozec and Bozec 
(2007) report a negative link between ownership concentration and disclosure of good CG practices. 
Additionally, using a sample of 100 South African listed firms from 2002 to 2009, Ntim and Soobaroyen 
(2013a, b) and Ntim et al. (2013) report a negative effect of block ownership on voluntary CSR and risk 
disclosures, respectively. Within the Saudi context, corporate ownership has historically been 
concentrated with control firmly in the hands of dominant royal families and government (Al-Razeen & 
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Karbhari, 2004; Piesse et al., 2012), and hence our prediction is that block ownership is more likely to 
affect voluntary CG disclosure. Thus, our first hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 1:  There is a statistically significant negative association between block ownership 
and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices.  
 
Institutional Ownership and CG Disclosure 
  
Agency theory suggests that due to their larger ownership stakes, institutional shareholders, as 
influential corporate stakeholders (stakeholder theory), have extra incentive to closely monitor corporate 
disclosures (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Core, 2001; Fung & Tsai, 2012). Therefore, managers will not 
only be expected to make more disclosures, including CG practices to meet the informational needs of 
institutional shareholders as powerful (stakeholder theory) corporate stakeholders (Deegan, 2002; Parker, 
2005), but also to secure their support in order to legitimise (legitimacy theory) or justify their continued 
stewardship of the company and its critical resources (resource dependence theory) (Branco & Rodrigues, 
2008; Chen & Roberts, 2010).  
Empirically and consistent with the findings of past evidence (Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 
2012a, b), both Hooghiemstra (2012), and Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) report a positive association 
between institutional ownership and voluntary CG disclosure in samples of 85 Dutch and 300 UK listed 
corporations, respectively. Similarly, Fung and Tsai (2012) report that US firms with high institutional 
ownership tend to have better performance and improved CG practices. Within the Saudi context, and 
although institutional ownership has traditionally been relatively low (Alshehri & Solomon, 2012; Piesse 
et al., 2012), the CMA has been keen on boosting shareholdings by institutions as part of the broader 
efforts at improving CG standards in Saudi companies (IFC, 2008; SFG, 2009). Also, the Saudi CG Code 
urges institutional shareholders to actively seek to enhance governance, performance and disclosure 
practices in Saudi companies, and thus our second hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 2:  There is a statistically significant positive association between institutional 
ownership and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG 
practices.  
 
 
Government Ownership and CG Disclosure  
 12 
 
 
 
As a powerful stakeholder (stakeholder theory) and given the Saudi government’s (through the 
CMA) formal support for the recommendations of Saudi CG Code (CMA, 2006; Alshehri & Solomon, 
2012), our expectation is that Saudi companies with high government ownership will actively seek to win 
government support (Deegan, 2002; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, b) by complying with the Code’s 
provisions through increased disclosure of CG practices that may not only help in legitimising (legitimacy 
theory) their operations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995), but also secure access to critical 
resources (resource dependence theory) (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009),  such as finance that 
can enhance performance. Also, agency theory suggests that increased disclosure of CG practices can help 
resolve agency problems between managers and government as an influential shareholder (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Core, 2001). Further, potential political interference and conflict of interests’ problems 
between shareholders and government that is often associated with government ownership can be 
minimised through increased voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, b).  
Prior evidence relating to the connection between government ownership and voluntary disclosure 
is limited, although Eng and Mak (2003) and Al-Janadi et al. (2013) find that government ownership is 
positively associated with voluntary disclosure, whilst Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a, b) and Ntim et al. 
(2013) report that government ownership impacts positively on voluntary CSR and risk disclosures, 
respectively. With regard to the Saudi corporate setting, the government holds significant ownership 
stakes in large public and private corporations through a number of institutions, including the General 
Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI), Public Investment Fund (PIF), and Public Pension Agency 
(PPA) with keen interest in CG and stakeholder issues and thus, our third hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 3:  There is a statistically significant positive association between government 
ownership and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG 
practices. 
  
 
Corporate Board Mechanisms 
Corporate Board Size and CG Disclosure 
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Agency theory suggests that increased managerial monitoring associated with larger boards can 
have a positive influence on corporate disclosures, including CG practices and performance (Samaha et al., 
2012), whereas others have suggested that larger boards are often characterised by poor co-ordination, 
communication and monitoring problems (Jensen, 1993; Ntim et al. 2015a, b), which can impact 
negatively on CG disclosure and financial performance. Also, resource dependence theory indicates that 
larger boards are associated with greater diversity in terms of expertise (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Chen 
& Roberts, 2010), experience and stakeholder (stakeholder theory) representation (Reverte, 2009; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013 2013a, b), which can enhance corporate legitimacy (legitimacy theory) and reputation 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995).  
Despite the mixed theoretical predictions, a number of empirical studies report a positive 
connection between board size and voluntary disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Hooghiemstra, 2012; 
Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a, b). For example, both Rouf 
(2011) and Samaha et al. (2012) find that board size is positively related to voluntary disclosure in a 
sample of 120 and 100 Bangladeshi and Egyptian listed corporations, respectively. Similarly and 
employing a sample of 100 South African listed firms from 2002 to 2009, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a, b) 
and Ntim et al. (2013) report that board size has a positive effect on voluntary CSR and risk disclosures, 
respectively. In addition, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) report a positive link between board size and voluntary 
disclosure in a sample of 87 Saudi listed firms. Also, the Saudi CG Code specifies that board size should 
be between 3 and 11, indicating that it considers board size as an important CG mechanism. Given the 
mixed theoretical literature, however, our fourth hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 4:  There is a statistically significant association between board size and the level of  
  voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices.  
 
Audit Firm Size (Auditor Quality) and CG Disclosure  
 
The appointment of external auditors to examine company accounts is an important governance 
mechanism for monitoring managers in order to reduce agency conflicts in modern corporations, whereby 
ownership is separate from control (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Han et al., 2012). One way of determining 
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external auditor quality is the level of disclosure, and in fact, audit firm size has been suggested to have a 
positive effect on corporate disclosure (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Eng & Mak, 2003) and audit quality 
(DeAngelo, 1981). This is because larger audit firms have greater financial strength, experience, expertise, 
information and knowledge (DeAngelo, 1981; Ntim et al., 2012a, b), which can improve their 
independence and ability to limit opportunistic activities of managers (Alsaeed, 2006; Aly et al., 2010).  
Empirically, a number of studies have reported a positive connection between audit firm size and 
corporate disclosure (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Eng & Mak, 2003; Han et al., 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013a, b). Of direct relevance to our study, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) report a positive association between 
audit firm quality/size and voluntary disclosure using a sample of 87 Saudi listed firms. Also, the Saudi 
CG Code recognises external auditors as one of the key stakeholders in ensuring that Saudi corporations 
voluntarily comply with its CG provisions. Therefore, our fifth hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 5:  There is a statistically significant positive association between audit firm size and 
the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices. 
 
The Presence of a Corporate Governance Committee and CG Disclosure 
  
The Saudi CG Code does not require Saudi corporations to set-up CG committees to continuously 
monitor compliance with its CG provisions. Therefore, our expectation is that Saudi listed corporations 
that voluntarily establish CG committees to specifically monitor their compliance are more likely to 
engage in good CG practices and disclose more than those that do not have CG committees (Core, 2001; 
Ntim et al., 2012b). There is a general lack of studies that investigate the link between the presence of a 
CG committee and corporate disclosure, and this is particularly acute in the case of Saudi Arabia, where 
there is also a clear dearth of voluntary CG disclosure studies. The only exceptions are studies by Ntim et 
al. (2012b, 2013) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a). Using a sample of 169 South African listed 
corporations from 2002 to 2006, Ntim et al. (2012b) report a positive connection between the presence of 
a CG committee and voluntary CG disclosure, and thus our sixth hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 6: There is a statistically significant positive association between the presence of a 
CG committee and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG 
practices. 
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Data and Research Methodology 
Data: Sample Selection, Sources, and Description 
The sample for the study is drawn from all 145 corporations listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(‘Tadawul’) as at the end of 2010 and Table 1 contains a summary of the sample selection procedure. 
Panel A of Table 1 contains the industrial composition of all the corporations that were listed on the 
‘Tadawul’, whilst Panel B of Table 1 contains the final sampled corporation with full data. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Board mechanisms, ownership structure and voluntary CG disclosures were extracted from the 
sampled corporations’ annual reports that were downloaded from the ‘Tadawul’ Website/Perfect 
Information Database, whereas the accounting/financial variables were obtained from ‘Tadawul’ and 
DataStream. To be included in our final sample, a corporation had to meet two main criteria: accessibility 
to a corporation’s complete seven-year annual reports from 2004 to 2010 inclusive and the accessibility to 
a corporation’s corresponding accounting/financial data for the same period. The criteria were set for 
several reasons. First, and in line with past studies (Eng & Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Henry, 2008), 
the criteria helped in meeting the requirements for a balanced panel data analysis, whose benefits have 
been widely articulated (Gujarati, 2003; Petersen, 2009). Third, the sample starts in 2004 because data 
coverage on the ‘Tadawul’ Website/Perfect Information Database/DataStream on Saudi listed 
corporations is very limited prior to 2004. Starting from 2004 also allows us to examine CG standards in 
Saudi corporations Pre- and Post-2006 CG reforms. The sample ends in 2010 because it is the most recent 
year for which data is available. As presented in Panel B of Table 1, and after excluding firms that had 
been suspended, merged, newly listed and with no/missing data, the complete data needed is obtained for 
a total of 80 firms for seven firm-years and 7 industries in our analysis.  
 
Research Methodology:  Definition of Variables and Model Specification 
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 We classify our variables into three main types and Table 2 contains full definitions of all them. 
First, and to test Hypotheses 1 to H6, our main dependent variable is the binary6 Saudi CG disclosure 
index (SCGI), which contains 65 CG provisions. The detailed provisions are presented in the Appendix. 
The SCGI seeks to measure the extent to which Saudi listed corporations voluntarily disclose information 
on their CG practices based on four broad areas specified by the 2006 Saudi CG Code, consisting of: (i) 
board of directors (BOD); (ii) disclosure and transparency (DAT); (iii) internal control and risk 
management (IRM); and (iv) the rights of shareholders and the general assembly (ROS).  
Insert Table 2 about here 
  Second, and to test Hypotheses 1 to 6, we collect data on ownership structures, including block 
ownership (BONR), government ownership (GONR), and institutional ownership (IONR), and on board 
mechanisms, including board size (BSZ), audit firm quality/size (AFZ), and the presence of a CG 
committee (CGC). Finally, and to control for potential omitted variables bias (Gujarati, 2003; Petersen, 
2009), we include an extensive number of control variables. These include capital expenditure (CEXC), 
dividend payment status (DV), leverage (LVG), firm size (FSZ), sales growth (SGR), industry dummy 
(INDU), and year dummy (YDU). For brevity, we do not develop direct theoretical connections between 
these control variables and voluntary disclosure of CG practices,  but there is extensive theoretical and 
empirical literature that suggests they can potentially affect voluntary CG disclosure (SCGI) (Botosan, 
1997; Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Aly et al., 2010; Rouf, 2011; Fifka, 2013; 
Hooghiemstra, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013).   
Assuming that all relationships are linear, our main ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
equation to be estimated in order to test Hypotheses 1 to 6 is specified as follows: 
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                    (1) 
where the variables are defined as follows: Saudi CG disclosure index (SCGI); block ownership (BONR); 
institutional ownership (IONR); government ownership (GONR); board size (BSZ); audit firm quality/size 
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(AFZ); the presence of a CG committee (CGC); and CONTROLS refers to all the control variables, 
including dividend payment status (DV), sales growth (SGR), capital expenditure (CEXC), leverage (LVG), 
firm size (FSZ), 7 industry dummies INDU), and 7 year dummies (YDU).  
We discuss the empirical results, including descriptive statistics and regression analyses in the 
following section. 
  
Empirical Results and Discussion  
 
Empirical Results from Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Regression Analyses 
 Table 3 presents the summary descriptive statistics relating to the level of compliance with the 
Saudi CG index (SCGI) (see Panel A of Table 3) and their sub-indices for the pooled sample, as well as for 
each of the seven firm-years examined. First, the summary descriptive statistics suggest that there is 
substantial degree of dispersion in the distribution of the SCGI. For example, the SCGI ranges from a 
minimum of 3.08% to a maximum of 90.77% with the average (median) corporation complying with 
44.61% (44.62%) of the 65 CG provisions investigated.  Second, and in line with the findings of previous 
studies (Patel et al., 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Mahadeo & Soobaroyen, 2015), the results in 
Table 3 suggest that compliance with the SCGI provisions generally improves over time, with the median 
(average) aggregate compliance levels increasing consistently from 17.08% (16.92%) in 2004 to 73.15% 
(73.85%) in 2010, a 56.07 (56.93) percentage point increase over the seven firm-year period examined.  
Third, we observe similar wide spreads and continuous improvements in the distributions of the 
four sub-indices. For example, the board of directors (BOD) ranges from 0% (0%) to 94.29% with the 
average (median) corporation complying with 37.30% (34.29%) of the 35 BOD provisions examined.  By 
contrast, disclosures relating to internal control and risk management (IRM) are lowest with a minimum 
(maximum) of 0.00% (50.00%) with the average (median) firm complying with 26.40% (0.00%) of the 6 
IRM provisions. Fourth, the student t-test of differences between Pre- and Post-2006 means/medians 
indicates that the levels of compliance and disclosure are significantly higher over the Post-2006 period 
than over the Pre-2006 period for both the summary SCGI and its four sub-indices (BOD, DAT, IRM and 
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ROS). This suggests that, on average, the introduction of the 2006 Saudi CG code has helped in improving 
disclosure and CG standards among Saudi listed corporations. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 Finally and in summary, the main evidence that emerges from investigating the complete sample 
of corporations is that despite the expectation that the introduction of the Saudi CG Code would speed-up 
convergence of CG practices (CMA, 2006; IFC, 2008; Alshehri & Solomon, 2012), CG standards among 
Saudi listed corporations still differ substantially. Whereas this is generally in line with the variability in 
compliance levels reported by previous CG disclosure studies (Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 2008; Bozec & 
Bozec, 2007; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013), it suggests that a 
high degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes to the importance that Saudi listed corporations attach 
to CG. Evidence of improving CG standards among the sampled corporations, however, implies that 
contrary to general concerns as to whether the Saudi CG code can help improve CG standards in Saudi 
firms given contextual challenges (Safieddine, 2009; SFG, 2009; Piesse et al., 2012), the current voluntary 
compliance and disclosure regime has had a positive effect on CG standards in Saudi listed firms. 
Table 4 reports summary statistics relating to the independent and control variables used. In 
addition, the summary statistics relating to the SCGI and its components are also repeated in Table 4 from 
Table 3 for the sake of completeness. Similar to the SCGI, the distribution of all the independent and 
control variables generally display wide variations. For example, return on assets (ROA) ranges from a 
minimum of 3.93% to a maximum of 23.93% with mean (median) of 6.76% (4.88%), suggesting that the 
average Saudi listed firm was profitable over the period analysed. Similarly, board size (BSZ) ranges from 
a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 12 with a median (mean) of 9 (8.42) board members. This compares 
well with the findings of previous studies relating to the distribution of corporate board size (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006; Barako et al., 2006; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-
Yong, 2012). For instance, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) report an average board size of 10 for a sample of 
Malaysian listed firms. In line with the findings of past studies (Alsaeed, 2006; Bozec & Bozec, 2007; 
Piesse et al., 2012; Soliman, 2013a, b), block ownership (BONR) is between a minimum of 0.00% (i.e., no 
 19 
 
 
block owners) and a maximum of 85.21% with a mean (median) of 61.96% (62.00%), suggesting that 
Saudi firms ownership structure is relatively highly concentrated. The figures for the CG indices (SCGI, 
BOD, DAT, IRM and ROS), audit firm size (AFZ), the presence of a CG committee (CGC), government 
ownership (GONR) and institutional ownership (IONR), as well as the control variables in Table 4 suggest 
substantial variation in our sample, and thus reducing any possibilities of sample selection bias. 
Observably, the student t-test of the differences in means/medians of Pre-2006 and Post-2006 
suggests that significantly more CG committees were voluntarily set up by Saudi listed firms in the Post-
2006 period to specifically monitor voluntary disclosure of CG practices than in the Pre-2006 period. This 
seems to explain the observed significantly higher levels of compliance and disclosure of CG practices in 
the Post-2006 period compared with the Pre-2006 period, and implying generally that the presence of a 
CG committee impacts positively on voluntary disclosure of CG practices. Additionally, the significantly 
positive and negative student t-test for FSZ and SGR, respectively, indicate that Saudi firms have become 
relatively larger in terms of total asset value, whilst their growth has been significantly slower in the Post-
2006 period compared with the Pre-2006 period, which may be explained by the negative effects of the 
2007/08 global financial crisis. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
We use OLS regression technique to test all our six hypotheses, and thus it is appropriate to 
initially examine a number of OLS assumptions, including multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, 
homoscedasticity and linearity. Table 5 reports the correlation matrix for all variables used in our analysis 
to test for multicollinearity. As robustness check, both the Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-
parametric coefficients are reported and, observably, the magnitude and direction of both coefficients are 
very similar, indicating that no major non-normalities remain. Both matrices suggest further that 
correlations among the variables are fairly low, indicating that no serious multicollinearities exist. In 
addition, we investigated (for brevity not reported here, but available on request) scatter plots for P-P and 
Q-Q, studentised residuals, Cook’s distances and Durbin-Watson statistics for homoscedasticity, linearity, 
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normality and autocorrelation, respectively, with the tests suggesting no serious violation of these OLS 
assumptions. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Table 5 indicates statistically significant connections among the SCGI, and the explanatory 
variables, and also between the SCGI and the control variables. For example, and as hypothesised, AFZ 
(audit firm size), BSZ (board size), CGC (the presence of a CG committee) and GONR (government 
ownership) are statistically significant and positively associated with the SCGI (Saudi CG index), whereas 
BONR (block ownership) is statistically significant and negatively related to the SCGI. Observably, IONR 
(institutional ownership) is statistically insignificant, but positively associated with the SCGI.  
With reference to the control variables, the findings suggest that larger (FSZ), highly geared 
(LVG) and dividend paying (DV) corporations make significantly more voluntary CG disclosures, whereas 
growing (SGR) corporations make significantly less voluntary CG disclosures. There is, however, no 
evidence to suggest that more capital intensive (CEXC) Saudi corporations make significantly less or more 
voluntary CG disclosures than their less capital intensive counterparts.  
 
Empirical Results from Multivariate Regression Analyses  
 Table 6 reports the results of the regression analyses of the effects of corporate ownership and 
board mechanisms on the extent of voluntary CG disclosures. Models 1, 2 and 3 report the results of a 
pooled OLS regression of the ownership, board mechanisms, and both ownership and board mechanisms 
along with the control variables on the SCGI (Saudi CG index), respectively. The results contained in 
Model 3, which is our main model generally indicate that the independent variables (ownership and board 
mechanisms) are significant in explaining cross-sectional differences in the voluntary CG disclosures. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 First, our results indicate that the coefficients on GONR (government ownership), IONR 
(institutional ownership), AFZ (audit firm size), BSZ (board size) and CGC (the presence of a CG 
committee) are statistically significant and positively related to the SCGI, implying that Saudi 
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corporations with high GONR, IONR, AFZ, BSZ and CGC generally make significantly more voluntary 
CG disclosures.            
The results in Model 3 of Table 6 suggest that BONR (block ownership) is statistically significant 
and negatively related to the SCGI, implying that Saudi corporations with block ownership disclose less 
on their CG practices. This finding offers empirical support for our multi-theoretical framework, which 
suggests that closer managerial monitoring and lesser information asymmetry that is usually associated 
with block ownership can be expected to minimise agency problems (agency theory) and improve 
financial performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993; Botosan, 1997), and hence a lesser need 
for increased CG disclosures in order to gain legitimacy (legitimacy theory) from powerful corporate 
stakeholders (stakeholder theory), such as creditors, employee unions, government and shareholders, 
whose resources (resource dependence), for example finance, contacts and contacts, are arguably critical 
to the ability of any corporation to maintain sustainable operations (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Chen & 
Roberts, 2010).  Thus, in this case, block ownership can serve as a substitute for good governance 
arrangements, including less disclosure relating to CG practices (Bozec & Bozec, 2007). In contrast, 
disperse ownership requires greater monitoring, which can be minimised through increased corporate 
disclosures (Enk & Mak, 2003; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, b). This also supports Hypothesis 1 and the 
findings of past studies, which suggest that BONR impacts negatively on voluntary CG and CSR 
disclosures (Patel et al., 2002; Alsaeed, 2006; Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Ntim et 
al., 2012a, b; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, b), but is not in line with the results of those that report a 
positive link between BONR and voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). 
Additionally, the economic importance of this finding is that a one standard deviation change (decrease) in 
BONR may lead to about 2.81% (i.e., 24.83% x 0.113) change (i.e., increase) in the level of the SCGI.   
Second and by contrast, the positive association between IONR and the SCGI provide empirical 
support for Hypothesis 2 and the findings of past studies that suggest that corporations with high IONR 
make more voluntary CG and CSR disclosures (Barako et al., 2006; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Mallin & Ow-
Yong, 2012), as well as those that report a positive link between institutional ownership and performance 
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(Fung & Tsai, 2012). The findings also offer support for recent attempts by the CMA at increasing 
institutional shareholding as part of the broader efforts at improving CG standards in Saudi corporations 
(IFC, 2008; SFG, 2009). Theoretically, the result is largely in line with the predictions of our multi-
theoretical framework that draws on insights from agency, legitimacy, resource dependence and 
stakeholder theories. For example, agency theory suggests that due to their larger ownership stakes, 
institutional shareholders, as influential corporate stakeholders (stakeholder theory), have extra incentive 
to closely monitor corporate disclosures (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Core, 2001; Fung & Tsai, 2012). 
Therefore, managers will not only be expected to make more voluntary disclosures, including CG 
practices to meet the informational needs of institutional shareholders as powerful (stakeholder theory) 
corporate stakeholders (Deegan, 2002; Parker, 2005), but also to secure their support in order to legitimise 
(legitimacy theory) or justify their continued stewardship of the company and its critical resources 
(resource dependence theory) (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Chen & Roberts, 2010). Economically, this 
finding implies that a one standard deviation change (increase) in IONR may be associated with about 2.10% 
(11.03% x 0.190) change (increase) in the level of the SCGI. 
 The positive connection between GONR and the SCGI provides empirical support for Hypothesis 
3 and the results of Eng and Mak (2003), Al-Janadi et al. (2013), Ntim et al. (2012b, 2013) and Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013a, b) that suggest that corporations with high government ownership make significantly 
more voluntary CG and CSR disclosures, as well as the broader objectives of government investments. 
Through the GOSI, PIF and PPA, the Saudi government holds significant ownership stakes in major 
corporations with keen interest in positively influencing CG and stakeholder issues. Thus, this finding 
offers empirical support for our multi-theoretical framework. Specifically, this finding suggests that as a 
powerful stakeholder (stakeholder theory) and given the Saudi government’s (through the CMA) formal 
support for the recommendations of Saudi CG Code (CMA, 2006; Alshehri & Solomon, 2012), Saudi 
companies with high government ownership tend to actively seek to win government support (Deegan, 
2002; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, b) by complying with the Saudi CG Code’s provisions through 
increased disclosure of CG practices that may not only help in legitimising (legitimacy theory) their 
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operations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995), but also secure access to critical resources 
(resource dependence theory) (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009),  such as finance that can 
enhance performance. Also, agency theory suggests that increased disclosure of CG practices can help 
resolve agency problems between managers and government as an influential shareholder (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Core, 2001). Further, potential political interference and conflict of interests’ problems 
between shareholders and government that is often associated with government ownership can be 
minimised through increased voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, b). 
The economic relevance of this finding is that a one standard deviation change (increase) in IONR may be 
associated with about 3.94% (19.69% x 0.20) change (increase) in the level of the SCGI. 
 Further, the positive coefficients on BSZ, AFZ and CGC indicate that Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6, 
respectively, are supported. The positive relationship between BSZ and SCGI is in line with the evidence 
of previous studies (Hooghiemstra, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Rouf, 2011; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 
2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2012a, b, 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 
b). Similarly, the evidence that AFZ impacts positively on voluntary CG disclosure is consistent with the 
findings of previous studies (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Eng & Mak, 2003; Han et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 
2013), whereas the positive effect of CGC on SCGI offers new empirical support for the findings of Ntim 
et al. (2012b), Ntim et al. (2013), and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a b). The positive CGC-SCGI nexus is 
also in line with the univariate (see Table 4) and bivariate (see Table 5) evidence, which suggests that 
establishing a CG committee to specifically monitor  compliance and disclosure of CG practices can 
contribute positively towards enhancing CG standards.  With respect to board size, theoretically, increased 
managerial monitoring associated with larger boards can have a positive influence on corporate 
disclosures, including CG ones and performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). In a similar 
vein, and with respect to audit firm size, larger audit firms have greater financial strength, knowledge and 
independence, which can impact positively on voluntary CG disclosure (DeAngelo, 1981; Owusu-Ansah, 
1998; Eng & Mak, 2003; Han et al., 2012). Economically, the implications of these findings can be 
quantified as, a one standard deviation change (increase) in BSZ, AFZ and CGC may be associated with 
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about 0.40% (1.76 x 0.231), 12.45% (49% x 0.254) and 9.66% (30% x 0.322) change (increase) in the 
level of the SCGI, respectively. 
Third, our findings so far suggest that cross-sectional differences in the SCGI can be explained by 
the independent variables, but since it contains voluntary CG disclosures from four different categories, it 
is possible for the link between each category and the independent variables to vary, with some potentially 
having strong connections with these variables and others maintaining weak associations. Thus, to 
examine the link between each voluntary CG disclosure sub-category and the independent variables, we 
re-estimate equation (1) by replacing the SCGI with the BOD (board of directors), DAT (disclosure and 
transparency), IRM (internal control and risk management) and ROS (rights of shareholders and the 
general assembly) at a time, and the findings are, respectively, presented in Models 4 to 7 of Table 6.  
The coefficients on the GONR (except the coefficient on the DAT and IRM), IONR (except the 
coefficient on the BOD, IRM and ROS), BSZ (except the coefficient on the IRM and ROS), AFZ (except 
the coefficient on the DAT and ROS) and CGC (except the coefficient on the BOD, DAT and ROS) remain 
statistically significant and positively related to all four voluntary CG disclosure sub-categories. Similarly, 
the coefficient on BONR (except the coefficient on the IRM) remains statistically significant and 
negatively associated with all four disclosure sub-categories, and thus largely offering further empirical 
support for our previous findings. The observed sensitivities in the coefficients also reflect the differences 
in the levels of disclosure with respect to the four CG disclosure sub-categories that are evident in Table 3, 
implying that Saudi corporations differ in terms of the importance that they attach to the various sections 
of the 2006 Saudi CG code. 
Finally, the coefficients on the control variables in Table 6 are generally consistent with 
expectations. For example, the coefficients on CEXC, DV, FSZ and SGR are positively associated with the 
SCGI, whereas the coefficient on LVG is negatively related to the SCGI. However, the coefficients 
relating to the control variables are not always statistically significant or consistent across the different 
models. 
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Additional Analyses  
We carry out additional analyses to investigate the robustness of our findings. First, and as 
previously discussed, our sample period covers the 2004-2010 period. Therefore, to ascertain whether 
there are differences in our results with respect to the period of examination, we re-estimate our 
regressions by splitting our sample into two sub-samples: Pre-2006 (i.e., from 2004 to 2005) and Post-
2006 (2006 to 2010) periods. To facilitate comparison, Model 1 of Table 7 repeats the main findings 
contained in Model 3 of Table 6. The results reported in Models 2 and 3 for the Pre-2006 and Post-2006 
periods, respectively, are generally similar. However, the statistical significance of the Post-2006 period 
findings are relatively strong compared with that of the Pre-2006 period, suggesting that the introduction 
of the 2006 Saudi CG Code appears to have helped in improving CG practices, and consequently, a tighter 
association between voluntary CG disclosures and board/ownership mechanisms. 
Second and as previously explained, all 65 provisions constituting the SCGI are equally weighted, 
but the number of provisions varies across the four sections, resulting in different weights being assigned 
to each section: board of directors (BOD) (54%); disclosure and transparency (DAT) (25%); internal 
control and risk management (IRM) (9%); and rights of shareholders and the general assembly (ROS) 
(12%). To ascertain whether our results are robust to the weighting of the four sections, we construct an 
alternative SCGI, defined as Weighted-SCGI, in which each section is awarded equal weight of 25%. 
Although there are slight changes with regard to the magnitude of the coefficients, our results reported in 
Model 4 of Table 7 remain essentially the same as those presented in Model 3 of Table 6, and thus our 
general conclusions remain unchanged. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 Third, differences in the opportunities and challenges that corporations encounter vary over time, 
implying that voluntary CG disclosure behaviour may be jointly and dynamically determined by 
unobserved firm-specific characteristics (Henry, 2008), which simple OLS regression may be unable to 
detect (Gujarati, 2003; Petersen, 2009). Hence, given the panel nature of our dataset, we run a fixed-
effects model to control for possible unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity. This involves re-estimating 
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equation (1), with the introduction of 79 dummies to represent the 80 sampled corporations. Our fixed-
effects results reported in Model 5 of Table 7 remain largely unaltered, implying that our findings are not 
sensitive to potential unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity.  
Finally, to address potential endogeneity problems that may arise from a simultaneous relationship 
between the board/ownership mechanisms and the CG disclosures, we estimate a lagged structure (i.e., by 
introducing a one year gap between the CG disclosures and board/ownership mechanisms), whereby the 
current year’s CG disclosures depend on the previous year’s board/ownership mechanisms. Similarly, the 
results reported in Model 6 of Table 7 is essentially the same as those contained in Model 1 of the same 
table, suggesting that our findings are generally robust to potential endogeneity problems that may arise 
from the existence of a simultaneous link between board/ownership mechanisms and the SCGI. Overall, 
the evidence emerging from our additional analyses make us reasonably confident that our findings our 
not driven by any endogenous relationships. 
 
Summary and Conclusion  
A number of emerging countries have pursued corporate governance (CG) reforms around the 
world. In this vein, Saudi Arabia, a major G-20 country has also pursued CG reforms in the form of the 
2006 Saudi CG Code, notably adopting the UK-style voluntary (‘comply or explain’) compliance regime. 
However, the Saudi corporate context is characterised by a highly hierarchical social structure, 
concentrated ownership, low institutional ownership, and weak enforcement of corporate regulations. 
These have raised critical concerns as to whether a voluntary compliance regime will be effective in 
improving CG standards. In this paper, we investigate whether and to what extent publicly listed Saudi 
corporations voluntarily comply with and disclose recommended good CG practices, and distinctively, 
examine whether the observed cross-sectional differences in such voluntary CG disclosures can be 
explained by ownership and board mechanisms. We use a sample of 80 Saudi listed firms from 2004 to 
2010 and 65 CG provisions based on the 2006 Saudi CG Code for our analysis. 
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 Apart from applying a multi-theoretical framework in interpreting our findings, we make a 
number of new contributions to the extant literature. First, analysis of the levels of compliance with the 
constructed voluntary compliance and disclosure index generally indicates that, despite the expectation 
that the introduction of the 2006 Saudi CG Code would speed-up convergence of CG practices, CG 
standards among Saudi listed corporations still vary substantially. At the aggregate levels, the scores range 
from a minimum of 3.08% to a maximum of 90.77% with the average sampled corporations complying 
with 44.61% of the 65 CG provisions examined, as well as the mean CG score increasing from 17.08% in 
2004 to 73.15% in 2010. Whereas this is line with the variation in compliance levels reported by previous 
studies, it indicates that a high degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes to the importance that Saudi 
listed corporations attach to CG. However, despite concerns as to whether a voluntary CG regime will be 
effective given the Saudi corporate setting, the scores indicate that compliance levels and CG standards 
among the sampled corporations have generally improved over the seven-year period investigated. 
Second, our analysis of the factors driving voluntary compliance and disclosure suggests that 
ownership structure and board mechanisms are generally significant in explaining differences in 
disclosure. Specifically, our results suggest that corporations with larger boards, a big-four auditor, higher 
government ownership, a CG committee and higher institutional ownership disclose considerably more 
than those that are not. By contrast, we find that an increase in block ownership significantly reduces 
voluntary CG disclosure. Our results are generally robust to a number of econometric models that control 
for different types of disclosure indices, general firm-specific characteristics and firm-level fixed-effects.  
Third, our evidence has important implications for policy-makers and regulators. For example, 
evidence of increasing compliance with the Saudi CG Code implies that efforts by various stakeholders, 
notably the Capital Market Authority (CMA) and Saudi Stock Exchange (‘Tadawul’), at improving CG 
standards in Saudi corporations have had some positive impact on CG practices of Saudi corporations. 
However, the large differences in the levels of compliance suggest that enforcement may need to be 
strengthened further. In this vein, establishing a ‘compliance and enforcement committee’ to continuously 
monitor compliance levels among listed corporations may be a step in the right direction. Similarly, as the 
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presence of institutional shareholders and a big four audit firm is demonstrated to have a positive effect on 
good CG practices, it provides the CMA, ‘Tadawul’ and the Saudi government the impetus to encourage 
greater institutional ownership and a big four auditing of Saudi listed corporations. Also, for managers and 
corporations, our evidence suggests that one way by which they can improve their CG standards is to 
establish a CG committee with the specific mandate to monitor their firms’ compliance with corporate 
rules and regulations, especially those relating to good CG practices.  
Finally, whilst our evidence is important and robust, some caveats are considered appropriate. We 
employ a binary scoring scheme, which treats every CG disclosure as equally important. Whilst findings 
based on our un-weighted and weighted indices are essentially the same, future studies may improve their 
analysis by constructing weighted and un-weighted voluntary CG disclosure indices. Similarly, as a result 
of data limitations, our analysis is limited to a number of factors that can influence voluntary CG 
disclosure. As data availability improves, future studies may need to investigate how other potential 
factors, such as foreign ownership and the number of analysts, influence voluntary CG disclosure. Further, 
we collect our data from corporate annual reports to conduct quantitative analyses. However, annual 
reports can sometimes convey mixed messages. Therefore, future studies may improve on our evidence by 
employing qualitative approaches, such as conducting face-to-face interviews and case studies with 
relevant stakeholders, such as auditors, company directors, the CMA, investors and ‘Tadawul’. This may 
provide a holistic understanding of the different determinants of, and motives for, voluntary CG 
disclosures. Furthermore, we note that because a considerable number of popular corporate board 
mechanisms, such as CEO role duality, frequency of board meetings, the proportion of independent non-
executive directors, the presence of board subcommittees (e.g., audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees) and executive compensation information are contained in the Saudi CG Code (see the 
Appendix), we are unable to include them as part of the potential factors that can explain observable 
cross-sectional differences in the level of voluntary disclosure of recommended CG practices. Our 
analyses are, therefore, limited to corporate board factors (e.g., board size) and other CG mechanisms (e.g., 
audit firm size and the presence of a CG committee), which are not already contained in the Saudi CG 
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index. Future studies may, therefore, enhance the insights that they offer by examining the extent to which 
these factors may influence voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. We will like to clarify the use of a number of terminologies, including ‘voluntary disclosure’, ‘good CG 
practices’, ‘board mechanisms’ and ‘ownership structures’ that are frequently referred to in this study. First, 
‘voluntary disclosure’ refers to the voluntary CG compliance and disclosure regime of ‘comply or explain’ 
which offers directors and managers the option to comply and disclose their CG mechanisms or explain 
why they have not been able to comply with specific CG provisions contained in the 2006 Saudi CG Code. 
In this case, the UK-style ‘voluntary compliance and disclosure’ regime can be contrasted with the US-style 
mandatory regime of ‘comply or else’, which explicitly mandates firms to comply with specific CG 
provisions, such as those contained in the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) or else face specified penalty or 
prosecution. Second, ‘good CG practices’ refer to best practice recommendations relating to CG that are 
contained in the 2006 Saudi CG Code that Saudi listed corporations are expected to comply with or explain 
why they have not been able to comply with in their annual reports. Third, ‘board mechanisms’ refer to CG 
structures relating to corporate boards, including board size, composition and the presence of a CG 
committee.  Finally, ‘ownership structures’ refer to ordinary shareholdings by block shareholders (holding 5% 
or more of a company’s ordinary shares), who may be individuals, governments and institutions.  
2. The CMA prohibits foreigners whether individuals or institutions from participating in the market. 
Following the 2006 market crash, however, the CMA has been keen on boosting foreign participation, and 
in August 2008, the CMA granted non-resident and non-Arab foreign investors the opportunity to indirectly 
buy Saudi shares through swap arrangements for the first time (SFG, 2009, p.6). The operation of the swap 
arrangements involves a process, whereby a CMA-approved and licensed Saudi local brokerage firm buys 
and holds shares on behalf of its foreign customers. Any profits, losses and dividends are then passed on to 
the foreign customers. Further, there are on-going discussions to permit full and direct participation by 
foreign investors as part of the general attempts at enhancing CG standards, disclosure and transparency in 
the market.   
3. For brevity, we avoid extensive discussions of these provisions, but the Appendix contains the relevant 
sections and the detail provisions of the 2006 Saudi CG Code. 
4. Unlike most prior studies, our analysis is informed by insights from a number of theories, including agency, 
legitimacy, resource dependence and stakeholder theories. As these are, however, widely available in the 
literature, we do not engage in detailed discussions of their meanings and underlying assumptions. Similarly 
we will like to acknowledge the possibility that the predictions of these theories may not be compatible with 
each other and thereby potentially impeding their ability to enhance our interpretations by combining them. 
However, Chen and Roberts (2010) suggest that multi-theoretical perspective should focus on theories that 
have a number of commonalities, including concepts, assumptions and predictions. Consequently, agency, 
legitimacy, resource dependence and stakeholder theories are selected because of their common foci. In 
addition and given that CG is a complex phenomenon, we consider it to be right to apply a multi-theoretical 
perspective, whereby certain components of voluntary CG disclosures may be explained more by some 
theories (more appropriate or applicable) than others.     
5. We note that because a considerable number of popular corporate board mechanisms, such as CEO role 
duality, frequency of board meetings, the proportion of independent non-executive directors, the presence of 
board subcommittees (e.g., audit, nomination and remuneration committees) and executive compensation 
information are contained in the Saudi CG Code (see the Appendix), we are unable to include them as part 
of the potential factors that can explain observable cross-sectional differences in the level of voluntary 
disclosure of recommended CG practices. Our analysis is, therefore, limited to corporate board factors (e.g., 
board size) and other CG mechanisms (e.g., audit firm size and the presence of a CG committee), which are 
not already contained in the Saudi CG index. We note this as a potential limitation of the study, and 
therefore discussed as part of the avenues for future research in the summary and conclusion section. 
6. Even though binary scoring scheme may fail to capture the relative importance of the various CG provisions 
(Unerman, 2000; Beattie et al., 2004; Barako et al., 2006), we adopt it for a number of reasons. First, there 
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is a general lack of a rigorously developed theoretical framework on which weights could be correctly 
assigned to different CG provisions, and thus using dichotomous scoring scheme obviates a situation, 
whereby our disclosure indices are excessively dominated by a particular set of CG provisions (Botosan, 
1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Second, the findings of past studies suggest that the use of weighted and un-
weighted indices tend to give similar results (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Barako et al., 2006). Fourth, binary 
scoring scheme is less subjective and easy to replicate (Henry, 2008). Finally, using a binary scheme to 
score disclosures in annual reports is supported by a rigorously established theoretical and empirical 
literature (Botosan, 1997; Meek et al., 1995; Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Alsaeed, 2006; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; 
Vinnicombe, 2010; Rouf, 2011; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012). 
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Appendix. Full List of the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Disclosure Index Provisions Based on the 2006 
Saudi CG Code 
    Corporate Governance (CG) Disclosure Index (SCGI) 
SCGI Theme  SCGI Item: Information on or Reference to 
Range 
of 
Scores 
Total 
Score per 
Item 
(i)  
Board of 
Directors 
 
 Board of Directors and Composition  
35 
1. Whether the roles of chairperson and CEO/MD are split. 0-1 
2. Whether the chairperson is an independent non-executive director.  0-1 
3. Whether the board is composed by a majority of non-executive directors. 0-1 
4. Whether directors are clearly classified into executive directors, non-
executive directors (NEDs), and independent NEDs. 
0-1 
5. Whether at least 1/3 of the board are independent NEDs. 0-1 
6. Whether directors’ membership on boards of other firm’s are disclosed. 0-1 
7. Whether members of the board do not hold directorships on more than 
five other listed firms. 
0-1 
8. Whether the board of directors’ meetings record is disclosed. 0-1 
9. Whether individual director’s meeting attendance record is disclosed. 0-1 
10 Whether directors’ biography, qualifications, experience and 
responsibilities are disclosed. 
0-1 
 Audit Committee  
11. Whether the committee has been established. 0-1 
12. Whether the committee’s remit/terms of reference is disclosed 0-1 
13. Whether the committee is composed entirely by at least 3 NEDs.  0-1 
14. Whether at least a member of the committee is literate in financial and 
accounting matters, such as being a chartered certified accountant. 
0-1 
15. Whether the chairperson of the committee is disclosed. 0-1 
16. Whether the chairperson of the committee is an independent NED. 0-1 
17. Whether members of the committee is disclosed. 0-1 
18. Whether the committee’s meetings record is disclosed. 0-1 
19. Whether the individual members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 0-1 
 Nomination Committee  
20. Whether the committee has been established. 0-1 
21. Whether the committee’s remit/terms of reference is disclosed. 0-1 
22. Whether the committee consists of a majority of independent NEDs. 0-1 
23. Whether the chairperson of the committee is disclosed. 0-1 
24. Whether the chairperson of the committee is an independent NED. 0-1 
25. Whether the members of the committee is disclosed. 0-1 
26. Whether the committee’s meetings record is disclosed. 0-1 
27. Whether the individual members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 0-1 
 Remuneration Committee  
28. Whether the committee has been established. 0-1 
29. Whether the committee’s remit/terms of reference is disclosed. 0-1 
30. Whether the committee is composed entirely by independent NEDs. 0-1 
31. Whether the chairperson of the committee is disclosed. 0-1 
32. Whether the chairperson of the committee is an independent NED. 0-1 
33. Whether the members of the committee is disclosed. 0-1 
34. Whether the committee’s meetings record is disclosed. 0-1 
35. Whether the individual members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 0-1 
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Appendix. Full List of the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance Disclosure Index Provisions Based on the 2006 
Saudi CG Code 
    Corporate Governance (CG) Disclosure Index (SCGI) 
SCGI Theme  SCGI Item: Information on or Reference to 
Range 
of 
Scores 
Total 
Score per 
Item 
(ii) 
Disclosure 
and Trans-
parency 
36. Whether the firm’s ownership structure is disclosed. 0-1 
16 
37. Whether the firm’s directors own at least 1,000 of the firm’s shares. 0-1 
38. Whether the details of compensation paid to directors are disclosed. 0-1 
39. Whether board’s total value of annual compensation of each director 
equals or is less than $53,000 or 10% of firms’ profit.     
0-1 
40. Whether the details of the CEO’s compensation are disclosed. 0-1 
41. Whether the details of top management’s compensation are disclosed. 0-1 
42. Whether a review of the firm’s operations and performance is disclosed. 0-1 
43. Whether the details of firm’s debt/loans are disclosed. 0-1 
44. Whether a firm’s five-year financial performance is compared/disclosed. 0-1 
45. Whether a firm’s strategies and objectives are disclosed. 0-1 
46. Whether the principal activities of the firm are disclosed. 0-1 
47. Whether a firm’s dividend policy is disclosed. 0-1 
48. Whether a firm discloses any related party transactions. 0-1 
49. Whether a firm has been penalized for breaking corporate regulations by a 
supervisory body, such as the Tadawul and Capital Market Authority. 
0-1 
50. Whether a board statement on the going-concern status of the firm is 
disclosed. 
0-1 
51. Whether a narrative regarding compliance/non-compliance with the Saudi 
CG code is provided 
0-1 
(iii)  
Internal 
Control 
and Risk 
Management 
52. Whether an audit report regarding the effectiveness of internal control 
system is disclosed. 
0-1 
6 
53. Whether the firm’s risk management policy, philosophy and procedures 
are disclosed. 
0-1 
54. Whether the major risks facing the firm are disclosed 0-1 
55. Whether a statement to the effect that the financial reports have been 
approved by the board of directors, CEO and CFO is disclosed. 
0-1 
56. Whether the board of directors provides a statement regarding consistent 
application of generally accepted accounting principles. 
0-1 
57. Whether the firm has drafted a corporate governance code. 0-1 
(iv)  
Rights of 
Shareholders 
and the 
General 
Assembly 
(GA) 
58. Whether a narrative regarding fact that the general assembly (GA) is held 
at least once a year is disclosed. 
0-1 
8 
59. Whether a narrative regarding the fact the agenda for a firm’s GA meeting 
had been announced on the Tadawul website is disclosed. 
0-1 
60. 
 
Whether a narrative regarding the fact that the firm’s shareholders have 
the right to vote by proxy is disclosed. 
0-1 
61. Whether a narrative regarding the fact the firm operates a one-vote-one-
share policy is disclosed. 
0-1 
62. Whether a narrative regarding the fact that the firm announces a GA 
meeting at least 20 days prior to the date of the meeting is disclosed. 
0-1 
63. Whether a narrative regarding the fact that the firm immediately informs 
the Stock Exchange through the Tadawul website about the outcome of 
the GA meeting is disclosed. 
0-1 
64. Whether a narrative regarding the fact that the GA convenes within six 
months following the end of the firm’s financial year is disclosed. 
0-1 
65. Whether the firm discloses its social contributions. 0-1 
Total 65 SCGI Items  65 
Scoring Procedure    
0:   If a particular corporate governance item is not disclosed. 
1:   If a particular corporate governance item is disclosed. 
 
Table 1. Summary of the Sample Selection Procedure 
 36 
 
 
Panel A: Industrial composition of firms listed on the 
‘Tadawul’ available to be sampled as of 31/12/2010 
No. in each 
industry 
Percentage 
of  sample 
Basic Materials 14 9.66  
Consumer Goods 27 18.62 
Consumer Services 31 21.38 
Financials  42 28.97 
Industrials 25 17.24 
Telecommunications 4 2.76 
Utilities 2 1.38 
Total firms available to be sampled  145 100.0 
  Less:  Suspended and merged firms    4  
            Firms with no yearly data available    34  
            Firms listed recently (2009 to 2010)    27  
                                   Total excluded firms 65 44.8 
Final selected sample 80 55.2 
Panel B: Industrial composition of sampled firms with 
full data 
No. in each 
industry 
Percentage 
of sample 
Basic Materials 8 10.00  
Consumer Goods 11 13.75 
Consumer Services 22 27.50 
Financials  11 13.75 
Industrials 23 28.75 
Telecommunications 3 3.75 
Utilities 2 2.50 
 Final selected sample 80 100.0 
Source: The Saudi Stock Exchange (‘Tadawul’).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary Definition of Variables 
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Table 3. Summary Descriptive Statistics of Levels of Compliance with SCGI  and Sub-Indices 
Dependent Variables 
  SCGI Corporate governance (CG) compliance and disclosure index consisting of 65 provisions 
from the Saudi CG Code that takes a value of 1 if each of the 65 CG provisions is disclosed, 
0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. 
  BOD Sub-index of SCGI related to the board of directors consisting of 35 provisions that takes a 
value of 1 if each of the 35 CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value 
between 0% and 100%. 
  DAT Sub-index of SCGI related to disclosure and transparency consisting of 16 provisions that 
takes a value of 1 if each of the 16 CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value 
between 0% and 100%. 
  IRM Sub-index of SCGI related to internal control and risk management consisting of 6 
provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 6 CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; 
scaled to a value between 0% and 100%.   
  ROS Sub-index of SCGI related to right of shareholders and General Assembly consisting of 8 
provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 8 CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; 
scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. 
  ROA Percentage of operating profit to total assets value and RISK is the standard deviation of 
ROA. 
Independent Variables 
  AFZ 1, if a firm is audited by a big-four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, 
Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
  BONR% Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total company 
shareholdings. 
  BSZ The total number of directors on the board of a company. 
  CGC 1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. 
  GONR% Percentage of government ownership to total company ordinary shareholdings 
  IONR% Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders. 
Control Variables 
  DV 1, if a firm paid dividends during the financial year, 0 otherwise. 
  FSZ Natural log of the book value of a firm’s total assets value. 
  INDU Dummies for each of the 8 main industries: banks and financial; services; building and 
construction; agriculture; petrochemical; industrials/manufacturing; cement; and others.  
  LVG% Percentage of total debt to total assets value. 
  CEXC% Percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets value. 
  SGR% Percentage of current year’s sales minus previous year’s sales to previous year’s sales. 
  YDU Dummies for each of the seven years from 2004 to 2010 inclusive. 
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Pre- and Post-2006 
Mean/Median 
Differences 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 All 
Mean All 
Diff. 
Median 
All Diff. 
Panel A: Saudi CG Index (SCGI)       24.575*** 21.232*** 
Mean 17.08 21.29 34.10 46.13 55.52 64.98 73.15 44.61   
Median 16.92 20.00 35.38 46.15 53.85 66.92 73.85 44.62   
STD 4.86 7.04 11.29 13.82 12.21 10.93 8.39 22.33   
Min 3.08 7.69 6.15 10.77 16.92 40.00 47.69 3.08   
Max 33.85 38.46 61.54 83.08 87.69 90.77 90.77 90.77   
Panel B: Board of Directors      21.210*** 23.001*** 
Mean 7.18 9.82 25.07 37.75 47.86 61.14 72.25 37.30   
Median 5.71 8.57 28.57 37.14 42.86 65.71 74.29 34.29   
STD 5.82 8.04 15.20 18.66 18.77 17.35 12.91 27.31   
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.71 31.43 34.29 0.00   
Max 34.29 34.29 62.86 88.57 94.29 94.29 91.43 94.29   
Panel C: Disclosure and Transparency      25.216*** 24.209*** 
Mean 21.80 29.14 43.44 60.31 71.56 76.80 81.48 54.93   
Median 18.75 31.25 43.75 62.50 75.00 81.25 81.25 56.25   
STD 9.11 13.52 15.85 17.57 11.85 11.94 9.30 25.60   
Min 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 43.75 43.75 43.75 6.25   
Max 50.00 62.50 81.25 100.00 100.00 93.75 100.00 100.00   
Panel D: Internal Control and Risk Management      15.544*** 11.816*** 
Mean 1.67 7.50 13.54 24.58 36.04 46.25 55.21 26.40   
Median 0.00 16.67 16.67 33.33 50.00 50.00 16.67 0.00   
STD 12.41 14.30 18.75 19.20 20.88 20.98 25.14 25.03   
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 0.00 0.00   
Max 50.00 50.00 66.67 83.33 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00   
Panel E: Rights of Shareholders       7.508*** 9.398*** 
Mean 62.50 66.09 70.31 70.63 71.56 72.19 73.91 69.60   
Median 62.50 62.50 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00   
STD 15.79 13.81 10.02 8.46 11.25 8.66 9.16 11.85   
Min 12.50 12.50 37.50 50.00 12.50 50.00 37.50 12.50   
Max 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50   
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of the aggregate levels of compliance with SCGI based on sub-indices from 2004 
to 2010. Also, it presents the Pre-2006 (i.e., 2004 and 2005) and Post-2006 (i.e., 2006 to 2010) mean/median differences for the SCGI and 
sub-indices with *** indicating the student t-test of the mean/median difference between Pre-2006 and Post-2006 sub-samples 
is significant at the 1% significance level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Summary Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent, Independent and Control Variables for All (560) 
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Firm Years 
      
Pre- and Post-2006 
Mean/Median 
Differences 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Mean 
Diff. 
Median 
Diff. 
Dependent Variables    
  SCGI (%) 44.61 44.62 22.33 3.08 90.77 24.575*** 21.232*** 
  BOD (%) 37.30 34.29 27.31 0.00 94.29 21.210*** 23.001*** 
  DAT (%) 54.93 56.25 25.60 6.25 100.00 25.216*** 24.209*** 
  IRM (%) 26.40 0.00 25.03 0.00 100.00 15.544*** 11.816*** 
  ROS (%) 69.60 75.00 11.85 12.50 87.50 7.508*** 9.398*** 
  ROA (%) 6.76 4.88 7.16 -3.93 23.93 46.230*** 50.919*** 
  RISK (%) 1.59 1.13 1.40 0.16 4.97 65.112*** 66.801*** 
Independent Variables       
  AFZ 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.132 0.152 
  BONR(%) 61.96 62.00 24.83 0.00 85.21 0.929 1.052 
  BSZ 8.42 9.00 1.76 4.00 13.00 0.856 0.732 
  CGC 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00   0.438*** 0.487*** 
  GONR(%)             42.17 42.22 19.69 0.00 83.69 .0919 0.933 
  IONR (%) 6.98 7.00 11.03 0.00 40.00 .0537 0.465 
Control Variables    
  DV 0.65 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.783 0.698 
  FSZ 21.42 21.36 8.84 18.61 25.53 2.315** 2.221** 
  SGR (%) 14.54 9.32 29.62 -37.62 89.66 -2.832*** -2.566*** 
  LVG (%) 21.46 8.85 27.27 0.00 84.15 1.622 2.001 
  CEXC (%) 8.57 5.87 8.25 0.11 28.83 -0.915 -0.883 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Saudi corporate governance disclosure index (SCGI); board and directors sub-index (BOD); 
disclosure and transparency sub-index (DAT); internal control and risk management sub-index (IRM); rights of shareholders and the general 
assembly sub-index (ROS); return on assets (ROA); and financial risk (RISK); Audit firm size (AFZ); block ownership (BONR); board size 
(BSZ); the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGC); government ownership (GONR); institutional ownership (IONR); capital 
expenditure (CEXC); dividend payment status (DV); firm size (FSZ); leverage (LVG); capital expenditure (CEXC); and sales growth (SGR). 
The last two columns present the Pre-2006 (i.e., 2004 and 2005) and Post-2006 (2006 to 2010) mean/median differences for the variables 
with *** and ** indicating the student t-test of the mean/median difference between Pre-2006 and Post-2006 sub-sample is 
significant at the 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
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         Table 5.  Pearson and Spearman Correlation Matrices of All Variables for All (560) Firm Years 
      
Variable SCGI GONR IONR BONR BSZ CGC AFZ FSZ LVG SGR CEXC DV ROA RISK 
SCGI 1 .130*** .061 -.119*** .073* .326*** .117*** .209*** .166*** -.159*** -.016 .093** .068* -.071 
GONR .144*** 1 .015 .628*** .312*** .043 .302*** .635*** .177*** -.002 .315*** .435*** .128*** .022 
IONR .045 .004 1 .354*** .230*** -.009 .280*** .302*** .285*** .020 .069 .096** -.093** -.084** 
BONR -.125*** .662*** .361*** 1 .343*** .059 .481*** .684*** .365*** .087** .347*** .392*** .137*** -.002 
BSZ .066* .260*** .225*** .318*** 1 .099** .297*** .526*** .226*** -.003 .248*** .251*** -.029 -.027 
CGC .321*** .082* -.014 .070* .092** 1 .065 .119*** .021 -.111*** .028 .003 .087** -.067 
AFZ .117*** .295*** .296*** .477*** .301*** .065 1 .524*** .412*** .081* .308*** .217*** .031 -.015 
FSZ .214*** .624*** .304*** .698*** .490*** .099** .523*** 1 .580*** .113*** .430*** .420*** .071* .013 
LVG .153*** .166*** .355*** .378*** .212*** .014 .408*** .592*** 1 .101** .314*** .023 -.157*** -.065 
SGR -.133*** -.004 .024 .083* .024 -.098** .077* .100** .077* 1 .206*** .040 .150*** .039 
CEXC -.015 .286*** .076* .326*** .245*** .018 .306*** .413*** .285*** .198*** 1 .224*** .020 .085** 
DV .097** .419*** .102** .389*** .260*** .003 .217*** .432*** .037 .043 .221*** 1 .414*** .028 
ROA .040* .164*** -.071* .180*** .011 -.085** .048 .120*** -.131*** .179*** .056 .491*** 1 .138*** 
RISK -.042 .094** -.088** -.052 -.057 -.078* -.015 .011 -.047 .032 .026 -.002 .172*** 1 
Notes: The bottom left half of the table contains Person’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-
parametric correlation coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate that correlation is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: 
the Saudi corporate governance disclosure index (SCGI);  government ownership (GONR); institutional ownership (IONR); block ownership (BONR); audit firm size 
(AFZ); board size (BSZ); the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGC); capital expenditure (CEXC); dividend payment status (DV); firm size (FSZ); 
leverage (LVG); sales growth (SGR); return on assets (ROA); and financial risk (RISK). Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 6. The Effect of Corporate Ownership and Board Mechanisms on the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices 
Model           SCGI                        SCGI                         SCGI BOD  DAT IRM  ROS  
 Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ownership Mechanisms Variables:    
   GONR  0.178 
(0.073) * 
- 
0.200 
(0.049) ** 
0.124 
(0.091) * 
0.046 
(0.346) 
0.107 
(0.141) 
0.442 
(0.000) *** 
  IONR  0.190 
(0.041) ** 
- 
0.053 
(0.081) * 
0.028 
(0.401) 
0.151 
(0.073) * 
0.082 
(0.177) 
0.001 
(0.496) 
   BONR  0.039 
(0.368) 
- 
-0.113 
(0.045) ** 
-0.254 
(0.026) ** 
-0.173 
(0.061) * 
-0.067 
(0.240) 
-0.135 
(0.073) * 
Board Mechanisms Variables:     
   BSZ  
- 
0.223 
(0.003) *** 
0.231 
(0.003) *** 
0.231 
(0.003) *** 
0.119 
(0.065) * 
0.077 
(0.126) 
0.032 
(0.311) 
   AFZ  
- 
0.273 
(0.010) *** 
0.254 
(0.018) ** 
0.208 
(0.047) ** 
0.127 
(0.137) 
0.164 
(0.049) ** 
0.030 
(0.380) 
   CGC 
- 
0.319 
(0.009) *** 
0.322 
(0.009) *** 
0.028 
(0.420) 
0.119 
(0.178) 
1.649 
(0.000) *** 
0.066 
(0.269) 
Control Variables:     
   FSZ  0.117 
(0.207) 
0.145 
(0.123) 
0.282 
(0.030) ** 
0.285 
(0.032) ** 
0.085 
(0.276) 
0.050 
(0.341) 
0.343 
(0.002) *** 
   LVG  -0.100 
(0.170) 
-0.101 
(0.158) 
-0.148 
(0.079) * 
-0.169 
(0.058) * 
-0.101 
(0.160) 
0.073 
(0.198) 
-0.106 
(0.103) 
   SGR  0.005 
(0.472) 
0.000 
(0.498) 
0.012 
(0.432) 
-0.058 
(0.211) 
0.126 
(0.032) ** 
0.005 
(0.469) 
0.022 
(0.346) 
   CEXC 0.136 
(0.044) ** 
0.076 
(0.171) 
0.072 
(0.184) 
-0.009 
(0.456) 
0.205 
(0.004) *** 
0.082 
(0.107) 
-0.155 
(0.008) *** 
   DV  -0.043 
(0.362) 
0.006 
(0.482) 
-0.024 
(0.422) 
-0.022 
(0.428) 
-0.007 
(0.478) 
0.221 
(0.013) ** 
0.089 
(0.176) 
Industry Dummies Included Included    Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included    Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 1.421*** 1.817***     1.835*** 1.861*** 1.897*** 1.665*** 1.538*** 
Durbin-Watson Statistics 0.924 0.950      0.960 1.012 1.085 1.316 1.183 
F-Value 20.452*** 21.808***     19.157*** 15.629*** 17.014*** 30.922*** 7.989*** 
Adjusted R2 41.0% 42.7%      42.8% 37.6% 39.7% 55.2% 22.1% 
No. of Observations 560   560       560 560 560 560 560 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard Errors technique. ***, **, and * denote significant at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Saudi corporate governance disclosure index (SCGI); board and directors sub-index (BOD); disclosure and transparency 
sub-index (DAT); internal control and risk management sub-index (IRM); rights of shareholders and the general assembly sub-index (ROS); government ownership (GONR); institutional 
ownership (IONR); block ownership (BONR); board size (BSZ); audit firm size (AFZ); the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGC); firm size (FSZ); leverage (LVG); sales growth 
(SGR); capital expenditure (CEXC); and  dividend payment status (DV). Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 7. Sensitivity Analyses of the Effects of Ownership and Board  Mechanisms on the Extent of Voluntary CG 
Disclosure 
Model 
SCGI 
(1) 
Pre-2006 
(2) 
Post-2006 
(3) 
Weighted-
SCGI 
(4) 
Fixed- 
Effect 
(5) 
Lagged 
(6) 
Independent Variable      
Corporate Ownership Mechanisms Variables:      
   GONR  0.200 
(0.049) ** 
0.008 
(0.367) 
0.280 
(0.049) ** 
0.293 
(0.006) *** 
-0.058 
(0.455) 
0.231 
(0.049) ** 
  IONR  0.053 
(0.081) * 
0.013 
(0.257) 
0.047 
(0.377) 
0.075 
(0.233) 
1.128 
(0.010) *** 
0.152 
(0.083) * 
   BONR  -0.113 
(0.045) ** 
-0.006 
(0.092) * 
-0.131 
(0.076) * 
-0.129 
(0.063) * 
-0.394 
(0.021) ** 
-0.018 
(0.044) ** 
Board Mechanisms Variables:    
   BSZ  0.231 
(0.003) *** 
-0.034 
(0.009) *** 
0.357 
(0.001) *** 
0.209 
(0.004) *** 
0.013 
(0.478) 
0.279 
(0.002) *** 
   AFZ  0.254 
(0.018) ** 
0.020 
(0.176) 
0.328 
(0.029) ** 
0.185 
(0.055) * 
0.004 
(0.491) 
0.285 
(0.022) ** 
   CGC 0.322 
(0.009) *** 
0.152 
(0.028) ** 
0.324 
(0.023) ** 
1.048 
(0.000) *** 
0.405 
(0.004) *** 
0.321 
(0.014) ** 
Control Variables:      
   FSZ  0.282 
(0.030) ** 
0.043 
(0.048) ** 
0.401 
(0.032) ** 
0.214 
(0.068) * 
0.288 
(0.222) 
0.318 
(0.035) ** 
   LVG  -0.148 
(0.079) * 
-0.031 
(0.045) ** 
-0.185 
(0.122) 
-0.155 
(0.063) * 
0.029 
(0.421) 
-0.156 
(0.109) 
   SGR  0.012 
(0.432) 
0.015 
(0.157) 
0.007 
(0.471) 
0.036 
(0.300) 
0.013 
(0.424) 
0.011 
(0.444) 
   CEXC 0.072 
(0.184) 
-0.020 
(0.094) * 
0.072 
(0.263) 
0.075 
(0.164) 
0.162 
(0.045) ** 
0.076 
(0.211) 
   DV  -0.024 
(0.422) 
0.067 
(0.002) *** 
-0.080 
(0.322) 
0.093 
(0.210) 
-0.189 
(0.102) 
-0.055 
(0.349) 
   Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
   Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
   Firm Dummies Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Included Excluded  
Constant     1.835*** 0.372*** 1.411*** 1.791*** -0.867* 1.332*** 
Durbin-Watson Statistics       0.960 1.628 1.005 1.084 1.199 0.947 
F-Value     19.157*** 3.996*** 10.326*** 24.702*** 9.126*** 14.738*** 
Adjusted R2      42.8% 25.3% 32.9% 49.4% 58.3% 38.7% 
No. of Observations       560 160 400 560 560 480 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard Errors technique. 
***, **, and * denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Saudi corporate governance disclosure 
index (SCGI);  government ownership (GONR); institutional ownership (IONR); ); block ownership (BONR);   audit firm size (AFZ board size (BSZ); 
presence of a corporate governance committee (CGC); capital expenditure (CEXC); dividend payment status (DV); firm size (FSZ); leverage (LVG); 
and sales growth (SGR). Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
